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ABSTRACT
The present study investigates whether retail investors believe that a CPA firm’s
liability exposure or the type of evidence collected by the firm impacts their ability to
remain unbiased during the audit. This study is inspired by calls for further research
pertaining to the benefits and effectiveness that big data can provide to the audit industry
or whether it could lead to more regulation. After receiving approval for the study by the
Institutional Review Board, retail investors responded to an experiment in order to gather
information for the study. The results indicate that retail investors believe that a CPA
firm’s decision will not be biased by neither the firm’s liability exposure nor by the type
of evidence the firm collects. These results are useful to accounting lawmakers who
previously expressed concern that a reduction of liability would impair auditors’
judgement during the audit. Similarly, these results may assist accounting lawmakers in
deciding whether or how to change auditing standards to reflect the benefits of big data in
auditing.

Keywords: Audit Evidence, Limited Liability Agreement, Sampling, Full Population
Testing, Big Data.
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Introduction
In the current audit accounting industry, there is a negative connotation
surrounding limited liability engagements due to the perception that auditors and their
associated accounting firms will not perform the audit to the best of their ability
(Reinstein, 2013). As a result, the United States federal government, through the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), struck down the privilege to include a
limited liability clause in the audit engagement letters of public companies (SEC, 2004).
However, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) did not
explicitly interpret the SEC’s ruling as banning all limited liability engagements –
specifically for audits of nonpublic companies (AICPA, 2013). These two standards
,created by important accounting regulatory bodies, created a conflicting duality for audit
firms of public and nonpublic companies and for their stakeholders.
Several studies such as Reinstein et al. (2009, 2013) have examined this
phenomenon or the notion that auditors would not exert equal or more effort whilst
engaged in a limitation of liability, but they have not been conclusive or encompassing.
This current study expands on the literature surrounding audit effort and limited liability
agreements to determine if increased audit effort in the form of 100 percent population
testing – via big data – negates or drastically reduces the negative perceptions of limited
liability agreements on financial reporting reliability among retail investors.
This study is inspired by calls for further research pertaining to the benefits and
effectiveness that big data can provide to the audit industry or whether it could lead to
more regulation. Appelbaum (2017) suggested further examination of the required audit
evidence testing method – sampling or full population – and the effects or trade-offs that
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could be required by investors. Currently, audit standards require audit evidence to only
be a sufficient, relevant sample, which is less than 100 percent of available data, to come
to an opinion on the financial statements of the company (AICPA, AU-C 530, 2020).
Since the decision to test the entire data population is voluntary under the current audit
evidence standards, auditor effort is a choice (AICPA, AU-C 150, 2001).
Yoon’s (2015) definition of big data is data having the characteristics of veracity
or a lot of “noise”, which means that auditors will be required to exert more effort,
skepticism, and professionalism to ensure the data complies with the required audit
evidence standards. Likewise, since statistical analyses now allow for the testing of big
data datasets, this should leave little to no margin for error on behalf of the audit
conclusion. As such, investors may want auditors using this method to be more liable for
their position. As a result, auditors could be hesitant to take on more liability for no
reward under the current paradigm, even if there is accessible software that can automate
the audit data analysis process easily. Dye (1993) suggests that auditors should
reasonably act in a manner that will maximize their wealth.
Due to the dual standards that currently exist regarding limited liability clauses,
an opportunity exists to examine whether 100 percent population testing – enabled
through the analysis of big data datasets – would improve retail investors’ perception of
CPA firms who use litigation reduction strategies. The research questions in this study
are tested in a 2 x 2 experiment that manipulates auditor effort (sampling versus full
population testing) and the level of litigation exposure (full exposure versus limited
liability exposure). The dependent variable being collected is the participants’ opinions
regarding a CPA firm’s ability to be unbiased during the audit under these conditions.
2

The participants in this study are retail investors. Retail investors are common
people who comprise the majority of investors; thus, they would be the key population
affected by regulatory decisions that impact audits of publicly traded companies. The
proxy for the retail investors were selected from a pool of students who at least have a
general knowledge of auditing and investments. The results of the study suggest that no
significant difference exists regarding perceptions of auditors’ ability to make unbiased
decisions, regardless of the type of audit evidence that they collected under either of the
liability conditions.
The rest of the paper is as follows. The next section is the literature review, which
builds upon the introduction to further develop the two hypotheses examined in this
study. The methodology follows this section, along with an analysis of the results. Lastly,
the conclusion is corroborated by the results, limitations of the research, and
recommendations for any further research.
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Literature Review
Taylor et al. (2003) state that the foundation of audit reliability principles in the
current paradigm relies heavily on the CPA firm’s independence. Auditor independence,
along with integrity and expertise, are underlying traits that assist the auditor in
maintaining objectivity during the audit (Taylor et al., 2003). The literature is
inconclusive as to (1) the best way to help an auditor remain independent in the audit and
(2) how to capture the degree to which an auditor is independent during the audit (Taylor
et al., 2003).
Research proposes an industry shift to focus on what is truly valuable to people
with a vested interest in companies – financial reporting reliability – with independence
being a subsidiary factor (Reinstein, 2009, 2013; Taylor et al., 2003). The current study
investigates this paradigm shift by exploring whether the use of limitation of liability
clauses impair perceptions of a CPA firm’s ability to make unbiased decisions during an
audit. This research also investigates whether the type of audit evidence collected by the
firms changes perceptions of the firms under varying liability exposure conditions.
Limitation of Liability Clauses (AU-C, §210.04)
According to the AICPA, Accounting Unit-Clause, AU-C, §210.04, a limited
liability agreement is a clause embedded in an audit engagement letter that lays out the
intent and scope of the audit with the subject company (AICPA, 2012). Ehrlich and
Williams (2008) reasoned that the prevalence of limited liability clauses in engagement
letters is due to the unlimited and increasing exposure to legal discourse that auditing
firms face. This is especially true of auditors who deal with high-risk companies
(Reinstein, 2009).
4

In spite of these concerns, the United States SEC changed the audit standards and
forbade auditors of public companies to include liability limiting clauses in engagement
letters (SEC, 2004), due to fears that it would facilitate languid practices (Reinstein,
2013). Furthermore, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), deemed that
limited liability clauses impede the objectivity and independence that firms must
maintain when engaging with the customer (FDIC, 2006). The main driving force behind
the restrictive new accounting standards was to enhance auditor independence after many
accounting scandals and failures throughout the 2000s.
Auditor independence is a critical factor in both the practice of auditing and the
academic auditing field. DeAngelo (1981) and Simunic (1984) focus on the importance
of auditors and their respective audit firms remaining independent of their clients by
defining, quantifying, and valuing auditor independence. Their papers initiated an
industry focus and reliance on auditor independence and the factors that affect the
perception of independence.
In contrast to the standard setters of public company auditors, the AICPA allows
auditors of private companies to include limited liability clauses in their engagement
letters if they meet the appropriate criteria (AICPA, 2013). The dual auditing standards
for public and non-public companies created conflicting perceptions regarding the
perceived value of auditor independence, which may obscure the ostensible negative
impact that limitation of liability clauses have on auditor independence. The lack of
agreement between the dual auditor independence standards inspired a line of research
that emphasized financial reporting reliability as a measure of the industry’s confidence
in the audit engagement (Wilson, 2015; Taylor et al., 2003). The current study examines
5

investors’ perceptions of audit firms and the reliability of the financial statements when
auditors of private companies incorporate limitation of liability clauses in their audit
engagement letters. This is captured in the first hypothesis:
[H1]: Limitation of Liability Agreements do not impair retail investors’
perceptions of a CPA firm’s ability to make unbiased decisions during an audit.
Audit Accounting Standards
Khurana and Raman (2004) suggest that more extensive audit standards coupled
with litigation risk improve the perception of audit quality among countries with similar
economic and institutional designs. This research supports Seetharaman et al. (2002),
who finds that an auditor's external environment wields enough tension to motivate
actions that shield themselves from additional threats to their wealth. These studies are
contradicted by Lennox's "deep-pocket" theory (1999) which proposes that firms who
have faced reputation damage do not seem to lose wealth and are thus not overly
influenced by the litigious environment. If auditors’ external environment (i.e. reputation
loss; goodwill) does not motivate them to provide quality work, then it is possible that
accounting regulators may be correct in their assumptions that auditor liability exposure
helps improve audit quality. However, several audit studies fail to prove without a doubt
that increased auditor liability leads to increased audit quality.
Extant research counteracts the current industry model by stating that auditors
should perform their duties in a way that both maximizes their wealth while also
maintaining professionalism (Taylor et al. 2003; Reinstein 2009, 2013; Dye 1993). If
auditors maintain their professional responsibilities, their main goal should be to ensure
that the financial statements are reliable so that stakeholders have enough confidence to
6

utilize them in financial decisions, not to portray and sustain an independent auditorclient relationship (Taylor et al., 2003). In the end, the client still pays auditors, and the
auditors’ reputations are on the line, which is a crucial proponent of their wealth
(Rothenburg, 2020). Whether investors will perceive audit quality and financial reporting
reliability to be appropriate continues to be an ongoing issue, which is consistent with
DeAngelo (1981).1
Auditor Effort and Audit Quality
One of the driving forces behind the prohibition of limited liability agreements is
the perception that auditors would lackadaisically perform their duties if they were
allowed to veil themselves from liability. This phenomenon could negatively affect
perceptions of audit quality. Audit quality describes the probability that an auditor will
discover and report a breach in the client's accounting system (DeAngelo, 1981), while
audit effort focuses on the probability that the auditor detects an existing problem
(Lennox and Caramanis, 2008). Research suggests that the amount of effort that an
auditor exerts is directly related to an auditor’s exposure to litigation risk (Patterson,
2003). Auditors have been found to work harder when presented with the opportunity to
absolve themselves of liability (Xiao et al., 2020; Kadous, 2000; Narayanan, 1994).
Despite the benefits that auditors may obtain by exerting additional effort during
the audit, research does not overwhelmingly support the incentive to exert this further
effort. While additional effort by the auditor may improve audit quality, Dye (1993)
suggest that auditors may be dissuaded from utilizing auditing methods that require more

1

DeAngelo (1981) examines the effect of auditor-client relationships regarding economic rent or “quasirent” that auditors earn since they are paid by their clients, which intuitively lowers audit independence.
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effort, chiefly because this additional effort overachieves the auditing standard while not
contributing to the auditors’ wealth. This suggests that auditors may be disincentivized to
employ progressive technologies that allow auditors to examine larger data sets,
especially as testing approaches 100 percent of the population. This avoidance may
diminish if auditors are allowed to limit their liability when dealing with their audit
clients.
Following Kadous et al. (2000), the current study operationalizes auditor effort as
a proxy for audit quality. Specifically, this study manipulates two methods of acquiring
audit evidence. Auditing standards currently require auditors to support their opinion
based on a random sampling of the population of available information (AU 150, 2001).
Therefore, this minimum data collection standard is designated as “low effort.” If
auditors acquire audit evidences using more intensive alternative methods – such as 100
percent population testing – this would be deemed as an exhibition of “high effort.”
These are the levels of auditor effort used in this study to examine perceptions of firms
whose independence is impaired by the use of limitation of liability agreements.
Big Data
The PCAOB AS1105 (2020) defines the required aspects of audit evidence as
needing to be relevant, reliable, and sufficient; these characteristics that are often
determined by the CPA firm’s use of professionalism and professional skepticism. One
area in which auditors may exercise skepticism and audit judgement is in the amount of
data they collect as audit evidence during the audit. At a minimum, auditors must test a
random sample of the population large enough to reach a reasonable conclusion or basis
of opinion for the entire population (PCAOB, AS2315, 2020). Audit evidence standards
8

allow auditors to examine higher “levels” of data, based on their professional auditing
judgement, up to and including testing the entire population sample. Until recently, this
was not possible; however, new data analysis tools enable auditors to perform tests on
these relatively large datasets more efficiently than was previously possible. The
literature refers to the large datasets that may be subject to advanced analytical
procedures as “big data”.
There is no set industry definition for big data, but it should be characterized by
being massive in quantity, fast rate of collection, and from a variety of sources (Lin,
2014). This aligns with Yoon’s (2015) definition of "big data" as data with incredible
size, variety, velocity, and veracity (noise). Big data is an amalgamation of data that
industries spend considerable amounts of money to store, process, format, utilize, and
analyze to solve problems, make decisions, or increase efficiency (Lin, 2014). Rather
than the traditional method of slowly “think-tanking” problems, industries can now turn
to these large data sets to quickly draw correlation and trends through the application of
progressive analytical technology to big data datasets to answer questions that arise (Lin,
2014).
Yoon (2015) states that most audited large and middle capitalization businesses
utilize big data in their decision-making process, but no research is conclusive as to how
external auditors can completely integrate big data into their work. Numerous studies
have called for more studies into the use of big data and its uses in audit data collection
and processing (Appelbaum, 2016, 2017; Brown-Liburd, 2015; Mock, 2009; Yoon,
2015). The present study seeks to contribute to this void in literature.
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Audit Effort Hypothesis
There appears to be a strong divide as to whether traditional audit sampling or 100
percent population testing improve perceptions of financial reporting reliability.
Complete population sampling is deemed more costly but more reliable, yet auditors can
quickly test the population with the correct audit analysis software (Appelbaum, 2017).
However, auditors who use complete population sampling compared to random sampling
within the current audit standards receive no additional benefits (Appelbaum, 2017).
Auditors’ use of big data and the related data analytics may improve financial
reporting reliability. Brown-Liburd (2015) describes the data environment that auditors
face when utilizing big data as having two components: corporate or financial and
boundary or non-financial related. Non-financial data can be anything collected that is
associate with the company's financial actions, such as GPS data, outside news articles,
point-of-sale data, social media posts, and many more data sources (Brown-Liburd 2015;
Yoon 2015). Auditors who use this data will have to exert more effort to manipulate and
format this data to conform with their audit analytics software (Brown-Liburd, 2015).
Yoon (2015) describes this practice as eliminating the noise in the data to normalize it,
which requires the auditor to substantially increase their effort. Eliminating this noise
also involves more skepticism and more professional judgement when determining what
data is sufficient and relevant (Brown-Liburd, 2015).
Appelbaum (2017) calls for research that examines the following questions: (1)
"Should auditing standards be changed to allow/facilitate these methods?" and (2) "What
are the trade-offs between 100 percent population tests, sampling, and ad hoc analytics?".
These questions guided the direction for the current study. With the SEC, PCAOB, and
10

FDIC allowing dual standards regarding limited liability agreements in engagement
letters with public and non-public companies, it opens the window to examine the impact
of increased audit effort on the perception of auditor independence and financial
reporting reliability. The reward of limiting auditor liability could make up for the
demand for increased audit effort while mitigating cost. The limited liability clause will
test as a joint impact variable with 100 percent population testing.
[H2]: Audit evidence that is gathered from 100 percent population testing
significantly improves perceptions of a CPA firm’s ability to make unbiased
decisions during an audit compared to audit evidence captured via traditional
audit sampling.
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Methodology
Experimental Design
The experiment performed in this study is a 2 x 2 between-subjects experiment.
This study was submitted to the Institutional Review Board on February 23, 2022 and
approved for data collection nearly forty days later (March 31, 2022). Participant data
was collected using Qualtrics© survey for approximately two weeks after approval of the
study.
Independent Variables
Two independent variables of interest are manipulated in this study. One
independent variable is the inclusion or exclusion of a limited liability clause in the
engagement letter’s liability disclosure section of the audit agreement with a nonpublic
company. This structure is consistent with Reinstein et. al.’s (2013) idea to examine the
effect that limited liability clauses have on investors’ perceptions of the trustworthiness
of the audited financial documents if investors knew about the CPA firm’s level of
liability exposure. The present study will randomly provide participants with two limited
liability manipulations (full liability versus limited liability) and record its effect on
measures that affect the financial reporting reliability of the audit outcome.
The second independent variable is audit effort, which serves as this
study's proxy for audit quality. The precedent for using audit effort as a proxy for audit
quality stems from Kadous (2000), which uses auditors who perform more work or effort
that exceeds the minimum audit standards as a substitution for higher quality audits. This
proxy was aligns with the structure of the present study. Current audit standards set the
minimum requirement for audit data as being a random sample; however, it is
12

recommended (but not required) to use complete population sampling when perceived as
reasonably necessary (PCAOB, 2020). By manipulating the audit evidence collected
(traditional sampling versus 100 percent population testing), it allows for the exploration
as to whether varying levels of auditor effort mitigates the negative perceptions
surrounding limitation of liability agreements.
The current audit standards are not updated to account for the capabilities of data
analytics on auditing in the current big data model of businesses. Thus, an opportunity
exists to test the contribution that complete population testing has on both data analytics
in auditing and limited liability agreements, which could be beneficial for future updates
Dependent Variable
Independence
With the audit industries’ intense emphasis on auditor independence coupled with
the ever-changing discernment of what independence is in actuality, Taylor et al.’s (2003)
concept of placing audit independence as an indirect, subsidiary variable to financial
reporting reliability becomes a realistic option. The principal reason for Taylor et al.’s
(2003) idea stems from DeAngelo’s (1981) idea of economic rent or the fact that audit
firms are receiving payment from their client for their services, which makes it
impracticable to reach complete independence from the audit subject. Consequently,
Taylor et. al. (2003) proposes a shift towards a focus on maximizing financial reporting
reliability rather than focusing on maximizing independence.
Retail Investors
Retail investors are individual, non-institutional investors who seek returns on
their invested capital (Paisarn, N. Chancharat, S. Chancharat, 2021). Retail investors
13

persist on a wide spectrum of risk-tolerance with some seeking safe, steady, low-risk,
lower return investments, while others are willing to take on high-risk for higher returns
(Paisarn, N. Chancharat, S. Chancharat, 2021). Retail investors generally conduct
analyses of their own investments, but they often act behaviorally based on their own
judgement and market information, regardless of if it is the rational decision (Paisarn, N.
Chancharat, S. Chancharat, 2021).
Due to the advent of technologies, investors now have access to more financial
information and history of investments and companies (Buddaraju and Devaiah, 2021).
Likewise, retail investors are more readily using financial information when making
investment decisions due to increased literacy in this subject (Buddaraju and Devaiah,
2021). Additionally, investors’ investment decisions are more aware, informed, and
affected when companies are involved in scandals or spread disinformation (Buddaraju
and Devaiah, 2021).
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Results
Survey Response Statistics
Survey responses were collected over an approximate two week collection period.
Over that collection period, the survey received a count of eighty-three respondents. Of
the eighty-three responses, only thirty-seven were deemed usable responses. The
response discarded did not pass a scrutiny check due to several factors. These factors
include: incomplete survey, failed manipulation check or irregularities in answer choices
such as the same response to all questions. The remaining usable responses (37) achieved
a 46% / 54% split between complete record (100 percent population) and sampling data
collection methods, respectively. Table 1 summarizes these responses below.
Table 1: Response Rates

Survey Demographics
Table 2 summarizes the demographic results of the usable responses. The thirtyseven (37) usable responses are distributed across the two experimental groups as
follows: sampling (20) and full population (17). Approximately ninety-seven percent
(97.30%) of the respondents are full time students, with almost seventy-five percent
(75.68%) not currently investing; thus, they would not be analyzing companies’ financial
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statements. Nearly thirty percent (29.73%) of respondents are not even business majors
with only eighteen (18.92%) of the respondents studying accounting or finance.
Table 2 Demograpics

Over half of the usable responses (62.16%) are under the age of twenty-one.
Collectively, the respondents’ demographic profile correctly invalidates the use of these
participants as sophisticated financial statement. Still, this meets the standard definition
of a retail investor, which is the type of investor selected for this research study.
16

Hypothesis Analysis
Table 3 reports the means, standard deviations, and the sample size related to the
responses submitted for this study.

Table 3 Audit Evidence ANOVA
Retail Investors’ Perceptions of Auditors’ Ability to Make Unbiased Decisions
Means, Standard Deviations and Sample Size
CPA Firm’s
Liability
Exposure

Evidence Collected: Evidence Collected:
Statistics
Sample of Accounts Complete Record
Mean
4.20
4.56
Std. Deviation
1.483
1.509
Full Liability
N
5
9
Mean
4.57
4.63
Limited Liability Std. Deviation
1.016
1.408
N
14
8
Mean
4.47
4.59
Std. Deviation
1.124
1.417
Total
N
19
17

Total
4.43
1.453
14
4.59
1.141
22
4.53
1.253
36

The results of the Analysis of Variance Test (ANOVA) is presented in Table 4.2
The experiment asks participants to opine as to whether they believe that a CPA firm’s
(1) level of liability exposure and (2) the type of evidence the CPA firm collects will
impact their ability to make unbiased decisions during the audit. The results of the
ANOVA test reveal that a CPA firm’s level of liability exposure (F = 0.211; p = 0.649) is
not perceived to affect CPA firms’ level of liability exposure. These results support H1.
Similarly, retail investors did not perceive the type of evidence collected by the firm

2

The results of non-parametric tests (untabulated) reveal similar findings.
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during the audit as a factor that would significantly impact the firm’s ability to be
unbiased during the audit (F = 0.146; p = 0.705). These results do not support H2.
Looking at the both of these tests together, one can conclude that a CPA firm will be
unbiased in their decision-making during the audit, which alleviates concerns that
limiting an auditors’ liability during the audit will be problematic for retail investors.
Table 4 Analysis of Variance Test
Dependent Variable: The impact of an auditors’ liability exposure on the ability to
make unbiased decisions.
Type III
Source
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F-Value Sig. b
Corrected Model
.467a 2
.233
.141 .869
Intercept
695.802 1
695.802 421.269 .000
Level of Liability Case
.349 1
.349
.211 .649
Evidence Collected Case
.241 1
.241
.146 .705
Error
54.505 33
1.652
Total
793.000 36
Corrected Total
54.972 35
a. R Squared = .008 (Adjusted R Squared = -.052)
b. Significance Level: p > 0.05
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Summary and Recommendations
The longstanding assertation that auditor independence enables audit judgements
to be void of bias, due to auditor objectivity, and thus more reliable has been the
foundation of audit standards for decades. Recently, there has been an influx of
dissenting opinions in audit literature, which began with Taylor et al.’s (2003) new
financial reporting reliability framework. Taylor et al.’s (2003) new framework sparked a
paradigm shift away from the antiquated view that valued independence over reliability
in audits. The main goal being improved financial reporting reliability would overcome
the hindering limitations associated with not only achieving “complete” independence but
also maintaining independence. There have been subsequent studies that expanded on the
framework that Taylor et al. purported (Wilson 2015; DeZoort et al. 2012; DeZoort and
Taylor 2009). However, there is no literature that examines the interrelationship of audit
evidence methodology and limited liability agreements on retail investors’ perceptions of
a CPA firm’s decision.
Overall, the experimental findings from hypothesis one suggest that retail
investors are indifferent regarding a CPA firm’s level of liability exposure (F = 0.211; p
= 0.649) when performing an audit. Likewise, the absence of a significant difference in
the proportion of retail investors who perceived the type of evidence collected by the firm
during the audit as a significant driver on the firm’s ability to be unbiased in the audit
decision (F = 0.146; p = 0.705) was contrary to what was expected. Collectively, the
results from H1 and H2 would suggest that neither the CPA firms’ liability exposure nor
audit data methodology is essential to retail investors when determining the validity of
the audit outcome.
19

Contributions to the Literature
The results of this study permeate into several aspects of audit accounting
literature. First and foremost, the study contributes to the literature surrounding Taylor et
al.’s (2003) study on a new paradigm in auditing by supplementing Wilson’s (2015)
study. Secondly, the study contributes to the call for more research by Appelbaum (2017)
regarding the impact big data can have on the audit standards and processes by
considering different audit data collection process due to big data capabilities. Finally, the
study is important to the AICPA, PCAOB, and State Boards of Accountancy in their ongoing development and revisions of standards in place to protect the public interest as it
relates to CPA firm’s audit data collection and liability exposure. The AICPA, PCAOB,
and State Boards of Accountancy may also use this research in future considerations
regarding whether a CPA should be required to perform full population test or continue
sampling, and if a CPA could be allowed to use limited liability agreements in their
audits of publicly traded companies as big data becomes more prevalent in the industry.
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Study Limitations and Future Research
As with any experimental research done in a controlled, hypothetical scenario, it
fails to encompass real world influences and intricacies. Likewise, those who were
surveyed were not the ideal candidates for this study, most were not investors or wellversed in audit accounting. Moreover, the number of usable respondents is not
statistically significant to draw conclusions for the study. If CPAs and more respondents
who are investors were an available audience, the results would be more material.
However, the scope of the experiment did not allow for such extensive surveying, and
complications with the IRB process limited the capability to survey of students.
Future research regarding this topic should have a more targeted audience of retail
investors. Research should also be conducted regarding specific aspects of financial
reporting reliability listed in Taylor et al’s (2003) and DeZoort et al.’s (2008) studies
such as professional skepticism, objectivity, independence, and assurance. More research
is still needed surrounding this topic and many others regarding the implications that big
data brings to business and consequently those responsible for auditing them.
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